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THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY EXCEPTION TO THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Rachel Simon* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Edward Snowden1 made Americans dramatically more aware of 
government surveillance—its very existence, as well as the danger it 
presents to civil liberties.  The advantages of surveillance for law 
enforcement are obvious,2 yet the population remains wary of a 
government inching ever closer to Big Brother.3  That said, outrage is 
muted by the reality that most of us have never felt its adverse effects 
directly.  Storied criminal defense attorney and law professor Mark 
Denbeaux (“Professor Denbeaux”) is an exception.  Although his story 
is rare today, it foreshadows events that attorneys around the world 
imminently face. 
 
 
 
* Rachel Simon, J.D., 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.Mus., 2007, The 
Juilliard School.  The author thanks her family, friends, and professors for their advice 
and support. 
 1  Edward Snowden is a former NSA contractor who revealed in June 2013 to The 
Washington Post and The Guardian that the NSA has been mass-collecting data on 
millions of American citizens’ phone calls.  Both newspapers won Pulitzer Prizes for 
the revelations; Snowden was charged with three federal offenses, including violation 
of the 1917 Espionage Act.  See Ed Pilkington, Guardian and Washington Post Win Pulitzer 
Prize for NSA Revelations, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2014, at A1, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/14/guardian-washington-post-
pulitzer-nsa-revelations. 
 2  See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at ¶¶ 9–15, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-10200 
(D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2013), 2013 WL 3231316 (explaining how Boston Marathon bomber 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was caught using private surveillance footage).  
 3  See, e.g., Cloaks Off, ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/international/21588890-foreign-alarm-about-american-spying-mounting-sound-
and-fury-do-not-always-match-0; Steven Erlanger, Outrage in Europe Grows Over Spying 
Disclosures, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/02/world/europe/france-and-germany-piqued-over-spying-
scandal.html?pagewanted=all; David Meyer, Academics Band Together to Plead for Online 
Privacy, GIGAOM (Jan. 3, 2014), http://gigaom.com/ 2014/01/03/academics-band-
together-to-plead-for-online-privacy/; Frank Pasquale, Focusing on Core Surveillance 
Harms, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2013/08/focusing-on-core-surveillance-harms.html. 
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Professor Denbeaux has defended Southern civil rights activists, 
Black Panthers, and Vietnam War protestors.4  He has served as a 
forensics expert before Congress and innumerable federal courts, 
including at the trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.5  
More recently, Professor Denbeaux has assumed representation of 
several detainees held as “enemy combatants” at the Military Detention 
Center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (“Guantanamo”).  Consequently, 
the United States federal government (“government”) monitors 
Professor Denbeaux’s communications—private and public, intimate 
and mundane, whether with his family or, most significantly, with his 
clients.6  Unfortunately, Professor Denbeaux is not alone; the 
government appears to be monitoring the communications of all the 
defense attorneys who represent Guantanamo detainees.7 
This kind of surveillance presents a two-fold problem.  First, 
government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications makes 
an unequivocal farce of our justice system, and undercuts the 
constitutional protections embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.  Second, despite the enormity of the invasion of 
Professor Denbeaux’s privacy, only two federal courts have even 
recognized that an attorney can state a Fourth Amendment claim for 
government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications.8  
Neither case was successful on the merits.  Thus, there is simply no 
impetus for the government to stop its illegal intrusions anytime soon. 
Other scholars note that government monitoring of attorney-
client communications immediately erodes the attorney-client 
privilege,9 directly violates the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel,10 and likely vitiates the Fifth Amendment right to 
 
 4  Mark P. Denbeaux: Seton Hall Law Faculty, SETON HALL LAW, http:// 
law.shu.edu/Faculty/fulltime_faculty/Mark-Denbeaux.cfm (last visited January 5, 
2015). 
 5  Id. 
 6  Interview with Mark Denbeaux, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School 
of Law (November 20, 2013). 
 7  See infra Part II; see also Spencer Ackerman, Guantánamo Hearings Halted Amid 
Accusations of FBI Spying On Legal Team, THE GUARDIAN (April 14, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/guantanamo-bay-hearing-halted-
fbi-spying. 
 8  See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (M.D. Fl. 2012) (attorney and client 
sufficiently stated a Fourth Amendment violation based on unlawful police 
surveillance at the police station to survive a 12(b)(6) motion); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 
F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 9  Kristen V. Cunningham & Jessica L. Srader, The Post 9-11 War on Terrorism . . . 
What Does It Mean for the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 311, 312 (2004). 
 10  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and 
the Uncertain Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006). 
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due process.11  However, these collective rights—privilege, due process, 
and right to counsel—may only be invoked by the client being 
prosecuted.  Likewise, where prior scholarship discusses the Fourth 
Amendment implications of government spying on attorney-client 
communications, it focuses on violations of the client’s constitutional 
rights.12  This focus is facially sound, considering that violations of the 
Fourth Amendment are typically remedied by suppressing evidence 
obtained by its violation;13 suppression of evidence has no remedial 
value as to the illegal intrusion on an attorney’s privacy.  Indeed, 
constitutional jurisprudence largely ignores or rejects the notion that 
an attorney has Fourth Amendment rights separate and apart from her 
client when it comes to monitoring attorney-client communications.14 
This Comment argues that there is not, and should not be, a 
“criminal defense attorney” exception to the Fourth Amendment.  
Specifically, the government should not be permitted to monitor a 
private citizen’s personal communications without a warrant simply 
because he is representing a criminal defendant—even if that 
defendant is accused of terrorism.  Because the Judiciary’s response to 
such egregious constitutional violations is patently insufficient, this 
Comment submits that Congress must legislate to keep the Executive 
in check.  Part II provides evidence of government surveillance of 
attorney-client communications, using Professor Denbeaux’s 
experience at Guantanamo to frame the issue.  Part III outlines the 
legality of such surveillance, insofar as Congress has passed laws 
allowing government surveillance of attorney-client communications 
in certain, limited contexts.  Part IV sets forth the current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and assesses what rights attorneys have to 
 
 11  U.S. CONST. amend. V; Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 335.  
 12  See, e.g., Teri Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless 
Monitoring of Attorney Client Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 295, 
298 (2004); Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-
Client Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
145, 155 (2003); ACLU, REGARDING EAVESDROPPING ON CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS (66 Fed. Reg. 55062) (2001), available at https://www. 
aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_drug-law-reform_immigrants-rights/coalition-
comments-regarding-eaves. 
 13  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (extending 
exclusionary rule to evidence found as a consequence of the initial constitutional 
violation, also known as “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (announcing exclusionary rule whereby unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
is inadmissible at trial).  
 14  See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 562–68 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (noting that eavesdropping on attorney-client communications violates 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but ignoring potential Fourth Amendment 
violations). 
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private communications.  Part V explains the ways in which 
government monitoring of attorney-client communications violates 
the Fourth Amendment rights of the attorney.  Part VI argues that 
Congress must legislate to provide both a cause of action for aggrieved 
attorneys and an incentive for the government to stop illegally spying 
on private citizens.  Part VII concludes the Comment. 
II.  EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT SPYING 
As of June 2013, it is beyond question that the United States 
federal government has been spying on its citizens for decades.15  The 
government publicly justifies its mass surveillance programs on 
grounds of national security and counterterrorism.16  Considering that 
Guantanamo is where the government houses alleged “high-value 
detainees” suspected of terrorism,17 it is less than surprising to learn 
that various federal agencies have been spying on daily activities at 
Guantanamo since its inception.  As detailed infra, what is perhaps 
more surprising is that such surveillance is occurring after the federal 
government has been admonished for secretly videotaping suspected 
terrorists’ meetings with their attorneys, on no fewer than four prior 
occasions. 
Before suspected 9/11 terrorists were sent to Guantanamo, they 
were held at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, 
New York.  In March 2003, the Department of Justice Office of the 
Inspector General (“DOJ OIG”) reported on pervasive breaches of 
private meetings between attorneys and their clients detained at the 
MDC: 
In total, we found more than 40 examples of staff videotaping 
detainees’ attorney visits.  On many videotapes, we were able 
to hear significant portions of what the detainees were telling 
their attorneys and sometimes what the attorneys were saying 
as well.  It appeared that detainees’ attorney visits were 
 
 15  See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps In To User 
Data Of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, at A1, available at http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. 
 16  See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Production of 
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. 13-109 (FISA Ct. August 29, 2013), 2013 WL 
5741573. 
 17  See, e.g., DONALD RUMSFELD, KNOWN AND UNKNOWN (2011) (“I wanted transfers 
of detainees to Guantanamo to be kept to a minimum—to only individuals of high 
interest for interrogation who posed a threat to our nation’s security.”); Memorandum 
from Donald Rumsfeld to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander, U.S. 
Central Command (Apr. 21, 2003) (declassified in part Jul. 9, 2010) (“We need to stop 
populating Guantanamo Bay with low-level enemy combatants.  GTMO needs to serve 
as an [REDACTED] not a prison for Afghanistan.”).  
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recorded intentionally. . . . In sum, we conclude[] that audio 
taping attorney visits violated the law and interfered with the 
detainees’ effective access to legal counsel.18 
Although the DOJ OIG clearly found that this conduct violated federal 
law19 and the detainees’ constitutional rights, it is unclear whether any 
remedial action was taken.  It appears that the government instead 
attempted to circumvent statutory and constitutional constraints by 
having clandestine agencies, rather than municipal policemen, 
conduct the furtive recording of attorney-detainee meetings. 
One notorious incident of a clandestine agency’s picking up the 
baton is the 2002 CIA recording of interrogations of detainee Abu 
Zubaydah.20  The recordings comprised ninety-two videotapes.21  One 
“initial purpose” of recording the interrogations was to create “a 
record of Abu Zubaydah’s medical condition and treatment should he 
succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care 
provided to him by [the] CIA.”22  That said, “[a]nother purpose was to 
assist in the preparation of the debriefing reports.”23  Indeed, the CIA 
listened to the audio from the videotapes of the interrogations to 
prepare debriefing reports.24  After public revelation of the tapes’ 
existence, the CIA’s Director of Clandestine Operations ordered the 
destruction of all ninety-two tapes in November 2005.25 
A second incident surfaced in 2010, when the CIA admitted that 
it had twice misinformed the Department of Justice about whether it 
possessed recorded interrogations of Ramzi Binalshibh.26  The CIA had 
previously claimed that it destroyed all recordings of Binalshibh 
around the same time it destroyed the ninety-two recordings of Abu 
Zubaydah in 2005.27  In 2010, however, the Agency admitted that it still 
 
 18  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN 
DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (2003), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/oig/special/0312/chapter3.htm#B. 
 19  Id. (noting violation of 28 C.F.R. § 543.13(e)).  
 20  CIA OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REVIEW – COUNTERTERRORISM 
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001–OCTOBER 2003), available 
at http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/CIA000349. pdf. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Dan Eggen & Joby Warrick, CIA Destroyed Videos Showing Interrogations, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2007/ 
12/06/AR2007120601828_pf.html. 
 26  US Confirms Interrogation Tapes, AL-JAZEERA (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/americas/2010/08/201081853357268955.html. 
 27  Id. 
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possessed two videotapes and one audiotape of Binalshibh’s 
interrogations. 
A third notorious incident of the United States’ conducting 
interrogation recordings involved the worldwide, broadcasted 
recording of Omar Khadr, a Canadian who was held at Guantanamo 
since the age of sixteen.28  In February 2003, Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service officials interrogated Khadr in Guantanamo.  In 
July 2008, Khadr’s defense attorneys publicly released recordings of 
the interrogation made by the recording equipment in the attorney-
client meeting room.29 A Special Agent for the United States Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”) watched and listened to the 
Khadr recordings one week after they were made and reported on the 
intelligence gathered during the sessions.30  Ultimately, seven hours of 
interrogations of Khadr conducted over four days at Guantanamo 
appeared in an edited, feature-length documentary film.31 
While the MDC recordings were generally of private attorney-
client meetings, the Guantanamo recordings were limited to 
interrogations, where a detainee’s attorney may or may not have been 
present.  That all changed in January 2013, when the discovery that an 
“external body” was surreptitiously monitoring and censoring the 
Military Commission hearings at Guantanamo, superseding the 
presiding judge’s supposed sole authority to do so, emerged.32  The 
external body censored Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Learned 
Counsel, David Nevin, while he recited the title of a motion that 
contained mostly unclassified information pertaining to CIA dark site 
prisons.  The Military Commission’s presiding judge, Army Colonel 
James Pohl, taken by surprise, stated: 
[I]f some external body is turning the commission off under 
their [sic] own view of what things ought to be, with no 
reasonable explanation because [there] is no classification 
on it, then we are going to have a little meeting about who 
turns that light on or off.33 
 
 28  Key Events in the Omar Khadr Case, CBC NEWS (Sep. 30, 2012), http://www.cbc. 
canews/politics/story/2012/09/30/omar-khadr-timeline.html. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Report of Investigative Activity, AIR FORCE OFFICE of SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, 60 
(Feb. 24, 2003), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/20080711 
khadr.pdf. 
 31  4 Days inside Guantanamo, YOU DON’T LIKE THE TRUTH, http://www.youdont 
likethetruth.com (last visited January 5, 2015). 
 32  Unofficial Transcript of the KSM et al. (2) Hearing Dated Jan. 28, 2013 from 
1:31 PM to 2:46 PM at 1445:14–1446:7, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/ 
MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
 33  Id. at 1446:2–7. 
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Within one week, Judge Pohl seemed to not only accept having an 
external body eavesdrop on, and censor, the Military Commission 
hearings, but also even defend the notion on the government’s behalf.  
Specifically, Judge Pohl challenged one defense attorney for Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri by asking, “[d]oes it surprise you that the United 
States government has all sorts of ability to monitor conversations 
throughout the world?”34 
Soon after the government’s display of courtroom eavesdropping 
capabilities, defense counsel for Guantanamo detainees learned that 
the meeting rooms assigned to them for private conversations with 
their clients had been bugged with convincingly disguised 
microphones for surreptitious audio recording.35  The microphones, 
made by Louroe, are hidden in realistic smoke detector shells 
mounted on the meeting rooms’ ceilings.36  According to Louroe, 
these microphones are “often used in law enforcement interview 
rooms,” because they are “sensitive enough to capture a suspect’s 
comments even when whispered.”37  That said, a public relations 
manager of Louroe specifically shunned clandestine usage of its 
products at Guantanamo: “If I’m monitoring audio covertly or 
surreptitiously, then it is 100% illegal.  Not only have I broken the law, 
but I can’t use any of that audio as evidence in a court case.”38  Public 
relations spin notwithstanding, however, there is no debate that the 
microphones in the attorney-client meeting rooms at Guantanamo are 
specifically designed for monitoring conversations that the speakers 
wish to keep confidential. 
 
 
 
 
 34  Unofficial Transcript of the Al Nashiri (2) Hearing Dated Feb. 5, 2013 from 
9:01 AM to 9:56 AM at 1556:3–5, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/ 
MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
 35  See generally MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS AT GTMO: 
GUANTANAMO BAY MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP (2013) [hereinafter DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS], 
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/  
upload/spying_on_attorneys_at_GTMO.pdf.  
 36  Transcript of the KSM et al. Hearing Dated Feb. 12, 2013 from 1:00 PM to 2:37 
PM at 1984:5–1985:11, 2021:4–2022:5, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/ 
MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
 37  Joseph Goudlock, Where Are You Using Louroe Electronics?, LOUROE ELECTRONICS 
BLOG (Sep. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.louroe.com/blog.php. 
 38  Cameron Javdani, Legal Use of Audio, LOUROE ELECTRONICS BLOG (Sep. 6, 2011, 
4:51 PM), 
http://louroe.com/blog.php.  
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Following the public discovery of the listening devices, Army 
Colonel John Bogdan ordered the audio recording equipment in 
attorney-client meeting rooms to be disconnected, but not 
dismantled.39  In addition to the secret microphones, however, each 
attorney-client meeting room also hosted at least two video cameras.  
Colonel Bogdan confirmed that there was one infrared camera 
mounted on the wall opposite “from where the detainee would be 
locked in when there was not a meeting,” and another encased, point-
tilt-zoom camera mounted in a corner.40  At least one of the video 
cameras in each of the attorney-client meeting areas is so sensitive that 
“from the distance they are in the cell, most definitely” they are capable 
of zooming to read “very tiny writing” on a document used during an 
attorney-client discussion.41  It is questionable whether installing, 
maintaining, and using video cameras with such powerful lenses 
exceeds the ostensible security needs at Guantanamo. 
On March 25, 2013, personnel from the Office of Military 
Commissions, Office of Chief Defense Counsel (“OCDC”) discovered 
that there had been corruptions to and loss of electronic files 
containing attorney work-product, attorney-client communications, 
and other privileged and confidential documents stored on the 
OCDC’s shared “O-drive.”42  The O-drive was the exclusive repository 
of all defense attorney work at Guantanamo; only those with the 
defense privilege were supposed to have access, and there was nowhere 
else for attorneys to save their work.  OCDC personnel also discovered 
that the defense attorneys’ internet activity, which itself revealed 
confidential work-product and client communications, was being 
monitored and reviewed.43  Several defense teams reported these 
intrusions to the OCDC, Military Commission, and Department of 
Defense staff.44 
On March 26, 2013, the defense team of detainee Ibrahim al Qosi 
alleged that the government conducted a search of 540,000 of its 
emails,45 in addition to allowing unrestricted access to all defense files 
 
 39  Transcript of the KSM et al. Hearing Dated Feb. 13, 2013 from 10:28 AM to 
12:02 PM at 2243:1–4, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/ MilitaryCommissions. 
aspx.  
 40  Id. at 2227:7–2228:19.   
 41  Id. at 2239:11–2240:8.  
 42  Defense Motion to Abate Proceedings at 1, No. CMCR-13-001, AE155A 
(U.S.M.C. Apr. 13, 2013). 
 43  Id. at 3.  
 44  Id. at 6–9. 
 45  Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Appropriate Relief to Stop the 
Unauthorized Disclosure of Privileged Defense Counsel Communications and Other 
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in response to court orders, Freedom of Information Act requests, 
congressional inquiries, and search requests from other governmental 
agencies.46  The government responded in April 2013 that no one in 
the Office of the Chief Prosecutor or on the Privilege Review Team 
reviewed the content of any privileged or otherwise confidential 
defense communication.47  Nonetheless, in May 2013, Colonel Karen 
Mayberry, OCDC Chief Defense Counsel for Military Commissions, 
certified that she had investigated these allegations with the 
government offices and agencies involved and found them to be true.48 
Colonel Mayberry uncovered further that: (1) IT and other staff 
were neither “trained in, [n]or in any way concerned with, attorney-
client confidences or privilege[s]”; (2) staff regularly turned defense 
files “over to the requester without any scrutiny as to whether the 
results contain[ed] privileged or confidential files”;49 (3) results turned 
over “without limitations on the personnel authorized to view the 
information”;50 (4) past assurances over the sufficiency of securing 
privileged and confidential documents using encryption and password 
protection “were wrong”;51 and, amazingly, (5) staff from the various 
agencies involved had been discussing the security and confidentiality 
problems since at least 2008—i.e., had been aware of the problems and 
simply failed to agree on the appropriate solution.52  As a result, 
Colonel Mayberry ordered all defense counsel, both military and 
civilian, to stop communicating client information via the provided 
email accounts, as well as to stop storing files on any provided drives.53 
In April 2014, the author personally witnessed the most egregious 
incident of government interference in the attorney-client relationship 
at Guantanamo to date.  On April 13, 2014, defense counsel for the 
five co-defendants in United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et al., who 
are accused of planning and executing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
jointly filed an emergency motion notifying the Military Commission 
that two FBI agents had interviewed the defense security officer 
(“DSO”) working for defendant Ramzi bin al Shibh’s team on Sunday, 
April 6, 2014 and compelled him to sign a “preventative cooperation 
 
Electronic Defense Records at 2, No. CMCR-13-001 (U.S.M.C. 2013). 
 46  Id. at 3.  
 47  Declaration of Col. Karen Mayberry, No. CMCR-13-001 (U.S.M.C. May 2, 2013). 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. ¶ 7.  
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. ¶ 5.  
 52  Id. ¶ 5–14.  
 53  In April 2014, Col. Mayberry advised the author personally that her directive 
remains in effect.   
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agreement” that included a non-disclosure provision.54  A DSO is a 
legal team’s advisor and liaison to government agencies on security 
issues.  In plain English, bin al Shibh’s DSO agreed to act as an ongoing 
FBI informant and not tell anyone about it, including the rest of his 
legal team.  The DSO had a change of heart and informed his 
supervisors of the FBI agreement on April 9, 2014.55 
The scope of the FBI investigation remains unknown, and the 
government’s substantive responses remain redacted.56  Media 
observers of the April hearings reported that the FBI questioned the 
DSO about alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s 
(“KSM”) defense counsel, specifically inquiring about how an 
unclassified manifesto57 penned by KSM was released to the media in 
January.58  In other words, the FBI was purportedly investigating KSM’s 
defense attorney in lieu of investigating KSM himself.  Although not 
providing affirmative information on the scope of the FBI 
investigation, the government has shot down the media reports as 
mistaken, stating that the FBI investigation does not pertain to that 
disclosure.59 
Even to a law student, it was painfully obvious that no one—
prosecution, defense, or judge—knew how to proceed when faced with 
the FBI derailment.  Indeed, Judge Pohl frequently asked both parties 
how they thought the hearings should proceed in order to devise a 
workable plan moving forward.60  Defense counsel argued that, as the 
subjects of an ongoing FBI investigation, they were conflicted insofar 
as their interests in defending against that investigation might conflict 
with their interests in defending their clients.61  Further, they could not 
 
 54  Emergency Joint Defense Motion to Abate Proceedings and Inquire into 
Existence of Conflict of Interest 
Burdening Counsel’s Representation of Accused, No. AE292 (U.S.M.C. Apr. 13, 2014).  
 55  Id. 
 56  See, e.g., Amended Order Re Emergency Joint Defense Motion to Abate 
Proceedings and Inquire into Existence of Conflict of Interest Burdening Counsel’s 
Representation of Accused, No. AE292QQ (U.S.M.C. Dec. 16, 2014).  
 57  Ryan J. Reilly, Mastermind of the Sept. 11 Attacks Wants to Convert His Captors, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
01/14/khalid-sheikh-mohammed-manifesto_n_4591298.html.  
 58  Spencer Ackerman, 9/11 Military Court Adjourns Trial until June amid FBI Spying 
Probe, THE GUARDIAN (April 17, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2014/apr/17/911-court-guantanamo-bay-adjourn-trial-june-fbi-spying.  
 59  See Public Government Response to Defense Emergency Motion, No. AE292H 
(U.S.M.C. Apr. 14, 2014).  
 60  See generally Transcript of the KSM et al. Motions Hearing Dated April 15, 2014 
from 9:15 AM to 11:13 AM, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/Military 
Commissions.aspx.   
 61  Id.; see Emergency Joint Defense Motion, supra note 54. 
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know whether members of their defense teams had signed non-
disclosure agreements with other agencies after being likewise 
approached, and such a lack of knowledge prevented them from 
advising their clients on waiver of the conflict.62  As such, Judge Pohl 
issued an order on April 15, 2014 requiring all current and former 
defense team members to disclose only to their lead counsel any 
disclosures/agreements with any federal agencies.63  Lead counsel was 
instructed to then make the ethical call on what needs to be disclosed 
to the MC to resolve a conflict of interest.  Defense counsel was further 
instructed to submit proposed orders stating what evidence and 
witnesses they want the Military Commission to subpoena to inquire 
into the FBI issue by close of business on Wednesday, April 16, 2014.64 
The government denies any knowledge of the FBI investigation.65  
That said, a former prosecution team member, Joanna Baltes, now 
serves as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Director of the FBI.66  At a 
minimum, this relationship raises questions about the prosecution 
team’s knowledge of the FBI investigation.  In an abundance of 
caution, therefore, Judge Pohl issued an order on Wednesday, April 
16, 2014, appointing a Special Review Team to review all matters 
pertaining to the investigation and Special Trial Counsel to represent 
the United States in order to keep the prosecution team led by General 
Martins insulated.67  The Special Review Team’s conclusions were later 
found insufficient to address all issues raised by the defense, and were 
not considered in the Military Commission’s December 2014 order (1) 
compelling the FBI to maintain a log of those who access the files of 
the (still sealed) investigation at issue, (2) requiring disclosure of that 
log to the Military Commission upon request, and (3) ensuring that 
the FBI investigative file remains sequestered from the government 
prosecution team moving forward.68 
In close, the Military Commission has twice been forced to set 
aside its docketed schedule and deal with unexpected intrusions by 
clandestine agencies’ spying on attorney-client communications.  As of 
 
 62  Emergency Joint Defense Motion, supra note 54. 
 63  Interim Order Re Emergency Defense Motion to Abate Proceedings and 
Inquire into Existence of Conflict of Interest Burdening Counsel’s Representation of 
Accused, No. AE292C (U.S.M.C. Apr. 15, 2014).  
 64  Id. 
 65  Transcript of the KSM et al. Motions Hearing Dated April 14, 2014 from 9:15AM 
to 9:51 AM at 7766, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions. 
Aspx.; see Public Government Response, supra note 59. 
 66  See Transcript of the KSM et al. Motions, supra note 60, at 7789–90.   
 67  See Interim Order, supra note 63. 
 68  See Amended Order, supra note 56. 
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December 2014, it is undisputed that the government recorded 
attorney-client communications at Guantanamo via audio and video 
recording,69  that the government deleted only defense attorney files 
on local computers,70 and—most significantly—that the government 
surveillors gave the illegally obtained evidence to the government 
prosecutors.71 
III.  LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENT SPYING 
Congress has passed legislation allowing government spying on 
attorney-client communications in certain, limited circumstances.  
These laws purport to place strict limits on when law enforcement is 
permitted to spy on attorney-client communications, in recognition of 
the sacrosanct place attorney-client communications hold in American 
law.  This section outlines the ways in which the government has 
statutory authority to legally and constitutionally intrude on attorney-
client communications, as well as the ways in which the judiciary has 
attempted to hold the executive branch to the legislature’s directives.  
As discussed in Part V, infra, the judiciary has been largely unsuccessful 
at reigning in the Executive. 
A.  The Federal Wiretap Act 
Before 1967, the police did not need to get a warrant to listen-in 
on conversations occurring over phone company lines.  But in that 
year, the Supreme Court decided two cases which made clear that 
unrestricted electronic surveillance could violate the Fourth 
 
 69  Even the prison’s lawyer and head warden admitted to audio surveillance.  See 
Chris McGreal, Guantanamo Commander Admits Listening Devices Eavesdropped on Lawyer 
Meetings with Clients, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2013), available at http://www. 
rawstory.com/rs/2013/02/18/guantanamo-commander-admits-listening-devices-eve 
sdropped-on-lawyer-meetings-with-clients/ (“The prison’s lawyer, Captain Thomas 
Welsh, told the court he discovered the room was fitted with hidden microphones early 
last year and reported it to the then warden, Colonel Donnie Thomas, to seek 
assurances that meetings between the accused and their lawyers were not being spied 
on.  Bogdan said he was not informed when he took over.  He told the court that the 
FBI was in control of the room until 2008 and that he has since discovered that the 
bugs were accidentally disconnected in October during renovations but then secretly 
reconnected by an unnamed intelligence service two months later, suggesting they 
were still in use.”). 
 70  See Daphne Eviatar, Lawyers Say Gitmo Computer Problems Make Defending 9/11 
Accused Impossible, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2013, 5:30 PM), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/daphne-eviatar/lawyers-say-gitmo-compute_b_3806590.html 
(noting deletion of defense attorney files). 
 71  See Peter Finn, Guantanamo Dogged by New Controversy after Mishandling of E-Mails, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2013), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 2013-04-
11/national/38458944_1_defense-attorneys-defense-lawyers-defense-counsel (noting 
that “hundreds of thousands” of defense emails were turned over to the prosecution). 
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Amendment.  In Katz v. United States (“Katz”), the Court held that 
eavesdropping counted as a Fourth Amendment search requiring a 
warrant.72  In Berger v. New York, the Court held that New York’s wiretap 
statute violated the Fourth Amendment because the statute: (1) was 
authorized for too long a time; (2) failed to require a specific 
description of the crime being committed or the persons or things to 
be searched; and (3) neither required notice to the target nor a 
showing of special circumstances to abrogate the notice requirement.73  
Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in 1968 to ensure that any electronic 
surveillance by federal agents complies with the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment post-Katz and Berger.74  Generally, the Wiretap Act 
“criminalizes and creates civil liability for intentionally intercepting 
electronic communications without a judicial warrant.”75 
Section 2516 of the Wiretap Act provides for the interception of 
wire, oral, and electronic communications by federal agencies upon an 
application to a federal judge showing that the interception may 
provide evidence of federal crimes.76  At a minimum, the application 
must state all facts justifying the applicant’s belief that an order should 
be issued77 and the time period of the requested interception;78 the 
judge may require additional evidence.79  The judge may authorize the 
interception if there is probable cause to believe that: (1) an individual 
 
 72  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 73  388 U.S. 41, 59–60 (1967).  
 74  See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972) (“Much 
of Title III was drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic 
surveillance enunciated by this Court.”). 
 75  Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 76  18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2012).  The judge may also grant orders authorizing 
interception of communications that may provide evidence of other enumerated 
offenses under Title 18, including: (1) Presidential and Presidential staff assassination, 
kidnapping, and assault (§ 1751); (2) hostage taking (§ 1203); (3) destruction of 
aircraft or aircraft facilities (§ 32); (4) threatening or retaliating against a federal 
official (§ 115); (5) Congressional, Cabinet, or Supreme Court assassination, 
kidnapping, and assault (§ 351); (6) wrecking trains (§ 1992); (7) production of false 
identification documents (§ 1028); (8) fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other 
documents (§§ 1546, 2516(1)(c), 2516(1)(p)); and (9) crimes related to alien 
smuggling (§ 2516(1)(p)). 
 77  18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1998).  The statement should include (1) details about 
the offense that is being or is about to be committed, (2) a description of the nature 
and location of the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (3) a 
description of the type of communications to be intercepted, and (4) “the identity of 
the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be 
intercepted.”  Id.  It must also state whether “other investigative procedures have been 
tried and failed, or why [such procedures] reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed 
if tried or [why such procedures would] be too dangerous.”  Id. § 2518(1)(c). 
 78  Id. § 2518(1)(d).  
 79  Id. § 2518(2).  
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is committing, has committed, or is about to commit one of the 
enumerated offenses; (2) communications concerning that offense 
will be obtained through the interception; (3) the place of 
interception is “leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used” by 
the surveillance target; and (4) “normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”80  The Wiretap Act restricts 
applicants for eavesdropping warrants to “publicly responsible officials 
subject to the political process” so that “should abuses occur, the lines 
of responsibility [would] lead to an identifiable person.”81  Finally, the Act 
provides that its enumerated remedies and sanctions are “the only 
judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations”82 
involving interception of wire and electronic communications.  As 
discussed in Part V, infra, constitutional violations of the Wiretap Act by 
federal actors are remedied in a Bivens action. 
The Wiretap Act provides a number of exceptions to its 
application, including when a party consents, when the target is 
foreign rather than domestic, and when a service provider rather than 
an agency is conducting the monitoring.83  The Act also allows for 
warrantless surveillance in the event of an emergency, which involves 
the “(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any 
person, (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security 
interest, or (iii) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized 
crime.”84  Significantly, the Wiretap Act provides specific protections 
for privileged communications, which maintain their privileged 
character regardless of interception.85  In recognition of the long-
established evidentiary rules of privilege, United States v. Turner made 
clear that telephone conversations are “privileged” under the Wiretap 
Act only if they are “privileged other than by virtue of their character 
as private telephone conversations.”86 
 
 
 
 
 80  Id. § 2518(3)(a)–(d).   
 81  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 2 Stat. 2112 United States 
Code Congressional and Administrative New, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968, 
Volume 2, p. 2112, Senate Report No. 1097.  See also United States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 
261, 265 (W.D. Pa. 1972).  
 82  18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) (1998) (emphasis added). 
 83  See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008).   
 84  18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1998).  
 85  18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1968). 
 86  528 F.2d 143, 155 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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While privileged communications are inadmissible at trial, law 
enforcement officers are not entirely prohibited from intercepting 
telephone conversations between attorney and client under the 
Wiretap Act.  Section 2518(5) requires that electronic eavesdropping 
be conducted “in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception,”87 including 
privileged and, presumably, constitutionally-protected 
communications.88  Nevertheless, law enforcement officers who have 
lawfully established a wiretap can monitor attorney-client 
communications to the extent necessary to determine that the attorney 
is not participating in criminal activity along with the subject of their 
investigation.89  This is known as the “crime fraud exception.”90 
Under the crime fraud exception, law enforcement officers may 
legally monitor attorney-client communications under the Wiretap 
Act.91  For example, in United States v. Johnston, federal Drug 
Enforcement Agents tapped the phone of defendant Johnston, an 
attorney, in investigating a marijuana distribution ring involving 
Johnston’s client.92  The Agents heard Johnston help the drug-dealing 
client create a false alibi, and Johnston was subsequently indicted and 
convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana.93  Johnston argued 
that the wiretaps violated the Wiretap Act’s minimization requirement 
because the inculpatory conversations were privileged attorney-client 
communications.  The Tenth Circuit disagreed, upholding the District 
Court’s ruling that because the content of the conversations was 
unlawful criminal advice and not lawful legal advice, the conversations 
were not privileged and thus not subject to the minimization 
requirement.94 
 
 87  18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1998). 
 88  See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1169 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“Section 2518(5) requires the government to minimize the interception of privileged 
communications.”); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 800, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(“[o]nce the parties have been identified and the conversation between them is 
determined to be nonpertinent or privileged, monitoring of the conversation must 
cease immediately.”). 
 89  See United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 869–70 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 90  See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 575 (1989), vacated in part on other 
grounds, 905 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 91  See, e.g., United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1994) (dismissing 
attorney’s Fourth Amendment grievance regarding government-sanctioned burglaries 
of his firm to obtain incriminating documents implicating him and a client in 
bankruptcy fraud).  
 92  146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id.   
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Although Johnston was in fact guilty of the conspiracy offense, the 
Johnston case illuminates the danger that the government’s violation of 
the Wiretap Act may be excused so long as it guesses correctly about 
an attorney’s participation in a crime.  That is, the government was 
monitoring Johnston’s private and privileged conversations and only 
learned that such conduct did not constitute a violation of the Wiretap 
Act when a court retrospectively determined the legal status of the 
conversations as non-privileged.  Had Johnston been innocent and 
given only legal advice, the government’s monitoring without any 
minimization procedures would have remained a Wiretap Act 
violation.95 
Of course, the Wiretap Act was enacted before cellphones and 
smartphones.  The Wiretap Act thus provides less assistance today, in 
that its drafters did not anticipate the growing popularity of wireless 
communications.  As will be seen, statutory amendments, as well as 
advancements in communications technology, resolved this issue by 
establishing recognizable privacy interests for parties to wireless 
conversations.96 
B.  18 U.S.C. § 2702 (Stored Communications Act) 
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
2702 et seq., seeks to protect records held by communications service 
providers, such as phone companies, internet service providers 
(“ISP”), webmail providers, instant message or text providers, or 
bulletin board sites.  In relevant part, the provision states: 
(a) Prohibitions.—(1) a person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the public shall not 
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a 
communication while in electronic storage by that service; 
and (2) a person or entity providing remote computing 
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any 
person or entity the contents of any communication which is 
carried or maintained on that service . . . ; and (3) a provider 
of remote computing  service or electronic communication 
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer 
of such service . . . to any governmental entity.97 
 In order to get a communications provider to turn over records 
beyond basic subscriber information, the government either has to get 
 
 95  18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1998). 
 96  See generally Dobbins, supra note 12, at 295.  
 97  18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2008).  
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a search warrant or a special court order.98  Section 2703 allows 
disclosure of an electronic communication (1) pursuant to a warrant, 
without notice to the subscriber, or (2) pursuant to an administrative 
warrant or court order, if the communication is over 180 days old, and 
with notice to the subscriber.  Section 2703(d) states that a court order 
may issue “only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records 
or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.” 
Section 2707 provides a civil action for any person aggrieved by 
the knowing or intentional violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2702.99  Section 
2707(b) states that relief may be granted in the form of preliminary, 
declaratory, or equitable form, that both compensatory and punitive 
damages are available, and that attorney’s fees and costs may also be 
granted.  While Section 2707(e) provides three “complete” defenses to 
violations of the SCA,100 Section 2708 provides that “the remedies and 
sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and 
sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”101  As with 
constitutional violations of the Wiretap Act, constitutional violations of 
the SCA by federal agents are remedied in a Bivens action, discussed in 
Part V, infra. 
Under the SCA, then, attorney-client communications may be 
monitored by the government if they are turned over by the content 
provider (e.g., Google, Yahoo, Hotmail) pursuant to a warrant or court 
order issued upon an epistemic, reasonable belief that the 
communications pertain to an ongoing criminal investigation.  Thus, 
theoretically, if the government believes a criminal has communicated 
with her attorney about the crime being investigated, then the 
government could potentially receive all attorney-client 
communications under the SCA.  Indeed, the attorney may never know 
that the government has obtained her attorney-client communications 
pursuant to the SCA,102 and certainly cannot take steps to redress the 
attendant privacy violation. 
 
 98  18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009).   
 99  18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2002).   
 100  The three complete defenses are: (1) good faith reliance on a court warrant or 
order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization; 
(2) good faith reliance on a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer . . . 
; or (3) good faith determination that . . . this title permitted the conduct complained 
of.  Id. § 2707(e).  
 101  18 U.S.C. § 2708 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 102  18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009).  
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C.  Bureau of Prisons Regulation, 28 C.F.R. 501.3 
On October 30, 2001, then United States Attorney General John 
Ashcroft authorized a new Bureau of Prisons rule (“BOP Regulation”) 
that allows warrantless monitoring of all communications between 
specified federal inmates and their attorneys when the Attorney 
General himself has a reasonable suspicion that the particular inmate 
“may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or 
facilitate acts of terrorism.”103  The BOP Regulation expressly applies 
to communications that fall within the attorney-client privilege.104 
On April 11, 2002, Lynne Stewart (“Stewart”), a criminal defense 
attorney, was arrested for providing material support and resources to 
a terrorist organization as a result of communicating with her terrorist 
client.  Stewart represented Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, leader of 
terrorist organization the Islamic Group, who was convicted for the 
1993 World Trade Center bombings.105 The government’s case against 
Stewart developed from monitoring her jailhouse communications 
with Rahman pursuant to the BOP Regulation.  Trial testimony showed 
that during prison visits to Rahman in May 2000 and July 2001, Stewart: 
(1) violated the BOP Regulation by distracting guards and acting as a 
decoy so that Rahman and his interpreter, Mohammed Yousry, could 
covertly discuss issues related to Islamic Group governance, strategy, 
and policy;106 (2) provided “cover” for Yousry to read letters and other 
messages from third parties to Rahman and for Rahman to dictate 
outgoing letters to Yousry;107 and (3) conveyed to a Reuters reporter 
Rahman’s politically charged statement that he was “withdrawing his 
 
 103  28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2003). The Attorney General may rely on information 
from the head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency.  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Indictment, United States v. Ahmed Abdel Sattar, Yassir Al-Sirri, Lynne Stewart 
& Mohammed Yousry, No. 02-395 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2002), available at http:// 
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/ussattar040902ind.pdf. 
 106  See Transcript of Stewart and Yousry at 17, Prison Visit with Rahman (May 20, 
2000), available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/5201.pdf (“Stewart: ‘I am making 
allowances for them looking in at us and seeing me never speaking and writing away 
here while you talk Arabic.’”). 
 107  See Transcript of Stewart and Yousry at 49–51, Prison Visit with Rahman (May 
19, 2000), available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/5191.pdf (Stewart stating that she 
can “get an Academy Award” for her performance covering Yousry’s private 
conversations with Rahman).  See also Trial Testimony of Lynne Stewart at 7764–66 
(Oct. 27, 2004), available at http:// www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/102704.txt 
(testifying to comments made to Yousry during May 19, 2000 prison visit). 
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support” for the cease-fire in Egypt that had been upheld by factions 
of the Islamic Group since 1997.108  Her conviction garnered 
widespread attention, highlighting the tension between a defendant’s 
right to unfettered communication with his lawyer and the ever-
increasing reach of the federal government post-9/11.109  To date, 
Stewart is the only terrorist’s lawyer who has faced criminal charges.110 
The BOP Regulation presents many of the same problems as the 
Wiretap Act and SCA.  Specifically, it lacks procedural safeguards 
beyond the Executive’s own discretion and, further, lacks either ante 
or post hoc judicial oversight.  Thus, while Stewart was guilty of aiding a 
terrorist,111 there may be other attorneys whose communications are 
being monitored who are wholly innocent.  All in all, the BOP 
Regulation does not appear to be a necessary tool in the government’s 
war on terror, given that these communications could be monitored 
pursuant to a court order under the Wiretap Act,112 FISA,113 or the 
Patriot Act.114  It does, however, make the unfettered monitoring of 
attorney-inmate communications by the government that much easier 
to accomplish. 
 
 
 108  See Trial Testimony of Esmat Salaheddin at 5573–75 (Sept. 13, 2004), available 
at http://www.lynnestewart.org/transcripts/091304.txt (testifying that Stewart 
conveyed Rahman’s statement regarding the cease-fire to a reporter); Trial Testimony 
of Lynne Stewart, supra note 107, at 7810, 1816 (stating that Salaheddin’s testimony 
was accurate).  
 109  See, e.g., Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Sheik’s U.S. Lawyer Convicted of Aiding 
Terrorist Activity, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at A01 (“Stewart’s case became a litmus 
test for how far a defense attorney could go in aggressively representing a terrorist 
client without crossing the line into criminal behavior.”); Victoria Ward, U.S. Civil 
Rights Lawyer Guilty of Aiding Terrorism, PRESS ASSOC., Feb. 11, 2005 (reporting Stewart’s 
conviction); Civil Rights Lawyer Lynne Stewart Convicted of Aiding Terrorists, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, Feb. 11, 2005 (discussing Stewart’s conviction). 
 110  See Laurel E. Fletcher et al., Defending the Rule of Law: Reconceptualizing 
Guantanamo Habeas Attorneys, 44 CONN. L. REV. 617, 673 n.150 (2012). 
 111  While Rahman was certainly a dangerous terrorist seeking to commit additional 
violence, further context reveals that Stewart’s prosecution was at least as much for her 
political support of dissidents like Rahman as it was for her criminal acts.  See generally 
Deborah L. Rhode, Editorial, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at 
A27; Birckhead, supra note 10, at 21; Laurel E. Fletcher et al., supra note 110, at 673 
n.150. 
 112  The Wiretap Act is available because the communications pertain to a national 
security interest.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1998).  
 113  Indeed, Rahman and Stewart’s communications were monitored pre-2001 
pursuant to a FISC order.  See Birckhead, supra note 10, at 21. 
 114  The Patriot Act is available because the communications pertain to terrorism.  
50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2014). 
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D.  The USA PATRIOT Act 
The USA PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”) plays a special role in this 
Comment, given its enactment as a counterterrorism-based 
surveillance statute.115  Generally, Section 215 of the Patriot Act 
(“Section 215”) allows government surveillance of communications if 
they are connected to terrorism.  Specifically, Section 215 allows the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to order any person or entity 
to turn over “any tangible things” if the FBI “specif[ies]” that the order 
is “for an authorized investigation . . . to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”116  It requires the FBI 
to provide a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the tangible things are relevant to the authorized 
investigation and to implement minimization procedures “applicable 
to the retention and dissemination.”117 
Nonetheless, Section 215 expands the FBI’s domestic spying 
power, insofar as the FBI (1) need not show probable cause, nor even 
reasonable suspicion, that the person whose records it seeks is engaged 
in criminal activity, (2) need not have any suspicion that the subject of 
the investigation is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and 
(3) can investigate United States citizens based, in part, on their 
exercise of First Amendment rights.118  The FBI can investigate non-
citizens based solely on their exercise of First Amendment rights.119  
Significantly, those served with Section 215 orders are prohibited from 
disclosing that fact to anyone else.120 
50 U.S.C. § 1861(e) provides that “[a] person who, in good faith, 
produces tangible things under an order pursuant to this section shall 
not be liable to any other person for such production.  Such production 
shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other 
proceeding or context.”121  While this provision protects the 
confidentiality of privileged material, there is no practical redress for 
a person whose privacy is intruded upon by another’s compliance with 
Section 215.  If, for example, one’s doctor were handed a Section 215 
 
 115  Indeed, its very name, USA PATRIOT Act, is an acronym for the “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.”  Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  
 116  50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2006).  
 117  Id. § 1861(b)(1)–(2).  
 118  Section 215 authorizes investigations of U.S. persons that are “not conducted 
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”  
Id. § 1861(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. §§ 1861(c)(2)(E), 1861(d)(1).   
 121  Id. § 1861(e) (emphasis added).  
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request for one’s medical records, the doctor could turn them over 
without fear of any liability despite the fact that the materials ostensibly 
retain their privileged status.  There would be no liability for the doctor 
and no redress for the patient, however, since the patient could not be 
informed that either the Section 215 request, or the doctor’s 
compliance with it, even existed.122 
A person violates Section 215 by either intentionally engaging in 
electronic surveillance that is not authorized by the Patriot Act or by 
knowingly or even negligently disclosing such surveillance.123  A 
violation of Section 215 is punishable by a “fine of not more than 
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.”124  It 
is a complete defense if the defendant was an investigative officer 
whose surveillance was conducted pursuant to a search warrant or 
court order.125 
As discussed further in Part V, infra, the complete secrecy of 
Section 215 monitoring and the complete defense of acting pursuant 
to a court order raise serious concerns for attorneys. First, the judicial 
check on the Executive’s use of Section 215—the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Courts (“FISC”)126—has been wholly ineffective insofar as 
the FISCs appear to merely rubber-stamp all Section 215 requests in 
the name of national security.  On these grounds, the FISC held that 
Section 215 authorizes ubiquitous surveillance of American citizens’ 
telephone and email metadata to sniff out suspected terrorists, which 
in turn does not violate the Fourth Amendment.127  If the FISC will 
authorize widespread and non-targeted surveillance in the name of 
counterterrorism, it appears that the FISC would readily authorize 
targeted surveillance of an attorney representing a person suspected 
of terrorism.  Second, that attorney would never know that her 
 
 122  See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c)(2)(E), 1861(d)(1) (2006). 
 123  50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 124  Id. § 1809(c).  
 125  Id. § 1809(b).  
 126  FISA is the acronym for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C. ch. 
36), a domestic statute that prescribes procedures for the physical and electronic 
surveillance and collection of “foreign intelligence information” between “foreign 
powers” and “agents of foreign powers” (which may include American citizens and 
permanent residents suspected of espionage or terrorism).  See 50 U.S.C. §1801(b) 
(2010).  FISA establishes Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts to provide judicial 
review of surveillance conducted under FISA’s authority to ensure constitutional 
compliance; any surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA must first be approved by a 
FISC.  Id. § 1809.  FISC proceedings are secret, ex parte, and non-adversarial; only the 
government submits evidence, after which the FISC judge approves or denies the 
surveillance. 
 127  See In re Application, supra note 16. 
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communications are being monitored pursuant to a Section 215 
order.128  Professor Denbeaux only asserts to know that his private, non-
Guantanamo-related communications are being monitored because 
government prosecutors have made statements and taken actions that 
would be impossible or inexplicable in the absence of surreptitious 
monitoring.  With the current FISC’s rubber-stamp approval, Section 
215 represents a sweeping authorization for the government to 
monitor the content of any person’s private communications, without 
his or her knowledge or consent, so long as the government can show 
some connection to terrorism.129  Without knowing the surveillance is 
occurring, the target cannot seek redress for the Fourth Amendment 
violation such monitoring represents. 
IV.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: AN ATTORNEY’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The Fourth Amendment grants the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”130  Security in one’s papers 
includes the right to privacy in all personal correspondence;131 security 
in one’s person includes the right to privacy as to one’s bodily integrity 
and freedom of movement.132A search is unreasonable, and the Fourth 
Amendment violated, when a government actor either (1) physically 
intrudes on a protected area or item to obtain information or 
evidence,133 or (2) violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
with regard to a protected area or item.134 
 
 128  50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c)(2)(E), 1861(d)(1) (2006).  
 129  In a public address, President Obama recently promised that federal agencies 
will now begin to limit their mass surveillance under Section 215 to “only” those persons 
“two steps removed” from known terrorists.  By this formula, because Professor 
Denbeaux communicates with his clients in Guantanamo (who are suspected of 
terrorism), and this author communicates with Professor Denbeaux, the government 
is likely monitoring the content of this author’s personal communications as part of 
its counterterrorism efforts.  President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signals [NSA] 
Intelligence Programs at The White House (Jan. 17, 2014).  
 130  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
 131  See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 529 (1977) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[T]ruly private papers or communications, such as a personal diary or 
correspondence . . . lie at the core of First and Fourth Amendment interests.”). 
 132  Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 51 
(1981).  
 133  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (re-establishing physical 
trespass as a Fourth Amendment search).  
 134  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(establishing that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when a state violates a 
person’s subjective expectation of privacy, where that expectation is one that society 
deems objectively reasonable).  
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Historically, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relied on 
property law, finding violations only where the government committed 
a physical trespass on a protected area or item.135  A paradigm shift 
occurred in Fourth Amendment analysis with the 1967 case of Katz.136  
In Katz, the police placed a listening device on the outside of a phone 
booth.  Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment “protects people not 
places,”137 the Katz Court held that the device violated the Fourth 
Amendment rights of the caller—notwithstanding the lack of a 
physical trespass into the phone booth—because it infringed on the 
caller’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan argued for a two-pronged test 
to find a Fourth Amendment violation, wherein a defendant must (1) 
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy, which is (2) one that 
society deems objectively reasonable.138  In Katz, the Court found that 
the caller manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by closing the 
phone booth door.139  Justice Harlan acknowledged that a phone booth 
“is a temporary private place whose momentary occupants’ 
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized [by society] as 
reasonable.”140  Because Katz’s conduct satisfied both the subjective 
and objective prongs of what later became known as the Katz test, the 
Court found that the government’s conduct violated Katz’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.141  The Court expressly adopted the Katz test in the 
1979 case of Smith v. Maryland (“Smith”).142 
For decades following Katz, Fourth Amendment cases turned on 
the right to privacy.  Then, in the 2012 case of United States v. Jones 
(“Jones”),143 the Court ruled that Katz had supplemented, rather than 
replaced, the earlier trespass standard.  In Jones, law enforcement 
officers attached a GPS device to the exterior of Jones’ car without 
Jones’ knowledge or consent and tracked his movements for twenty-
 
 135  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding no trespass, and thus 
no Fourth Amendment violation, where wiretapping occurred on the outside of a 
building); see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (“Detectaphone” on 
outside of building not a Fourth Amendment violation); On Lee v. United States, 343 
U.S. 747 (1952) (speaker’s consent to presence of informant precluded trespass, 
required to find Fourth Amendment violation). 
 136  389 U.S. at 347.   
 137  Id. at 351. 
 138  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 139  Id. at 352. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. at 359. 
 142  442 U.S. 735, 739–40 (1979). 
 143  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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eight straight days.144  Since the intrusion on the vehicle—a common 
law trespass—was for the purpose of obtaining information, the Court 
ruled that it was a Fourth Amendment search and unreasonable absent 
a warrant.145 The Court relied on Jones’ “trespass” reasoning in Florida 
v. Jardines146 to rule that police cannot bring a drug-detection dog to 
sniff at the front door of a home without probable cause and a warrant. 
In the aftermath of Jones, if a government action is designed to 
obtain information, then either a trespass or a “Katz invasion of 
privacy” will render that action a search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Thus, an attorney may rely on either physical trespass or 
a Katz invasion of privacy in asserting a violation of her Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
A.  Limits of the Fourth Amendment—Public vs. Private Papers 
This Comment addresses government surveillance of an 
attorney’s person, as well as his papers, via surreptitious electronic 
recording.  As to papers, the Fourth Amendment does not protect that 
which is voluntarily exposed to the public.147  Instead, it is primarily 
concerned with protecting that which comprises a person’s intimate 
life.  For the purposes of constitutional protection, therefore, it is 
paramount to distinguish between public and private papers. 
In the 1976 case of United States v. Miller (“Miller”), the Supreme 
Court held that citizens have no privacy expectation in their bank 
records, insofar as the information kept in these papers is voluntarily 
conveyed to the banks in the usual course of business.148  Applying similar 
reasoning, the Court held in the 1979 case of Smith149 that Americans 
have no expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial; as 
a result, a subpoena on telephone companies to turn over pen registers 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.150  Bank and telephone 
records, therefore, are public papers for constitutional purposes. 
Smith and Miller are distinguishable from the instant situation on 
a number of grounds.  First, the validly gathered information in those 
cases did not comprise private communications that have recognized 
constitutional and evidentiary protections.  Here, both attorney-client 
conversations, as well as notes and emails drafted by the attorney in the 
 
 144  Id. at 948.  
 145  Id. at 954. 
 146  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013). 
 147  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).  
 148  Id.  
 149  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 150  Id. at 745–46. 
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course of his legal representation, are afforded attorney-client and 
work-product privilege in addition to protection under the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel that bars 
interception of attorney-client communications.151  Second, the 
information in Smith and Miller was voluntarily turned over to third-
parties, who in turn gave it to the government; here, the government 
is illegally taking the information without the parties’ knowledge or 
consent.152  Thus, neither Smith nor Miller provides a barrier to recovery 
by an attorney whose private communications are monitored without 
his knowledge or consent.  If anything, these cases serve to underscore 
that, where information is not voluntarily turned over to a third 
party—indeed, where measures have been taken to guard against the 
possibility that third parties will obtain that information—the 
information retains its Fourth Amendment privacy protections. 
B.  Limits of the Fourth Amendment—Personal Rights 
United States v. Payner (“Payner”) is often cited for the proposition 
that attorneys do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy distinct 
from their client’s.  This reliance on Payner is misplaced.  Payner held 
that constitutional rights are personal and may not be vicariously 
asserted.153  In Payner, the IRS broke into a banker’s briefcase to steal 
documents about defendant Payner’s fraudulent transactions.  The 
Supreme Court held that the defendant had no recourse for the 
knowingly illegal intrusion into the banker’s briefcase because the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in either (1) 
another person’s effects/papers or (2) the information he had 
voluntarily turned over to the banker. 
The Payner Court did not, however, hold that the banker had no 
recourse for the violation of his personal constitutional rights, which is 
the precise issue this Comment addresses.  Said another way, Payner 
precludes Professor Denbeaux’s client from seeking to suppress emails 
stolen from Professor Denbeaux’s account, but does not preclude 
Professor Denbeaux himself from asserting a violation of his own 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Thus, Payner cannot be used to deny that 
an attorney has Fourth Amendment rights distinct from his client’s. 
 
 151  See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (preventing defendant 
from consulting with counsel during overnight recess violates Sixth Amendment); 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 563 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“[G]overnmental incursions into confidential lawyer-client communications threaten 
criminal defendants’ right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). 
 152  See infra Part II; see also supra note 7.  
 153  United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
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C.  Limits of the Fourth Amendment—Privacy Expectations in Jail 
An incarcerated person has a lesser expectation of privacy than a 
free man.154  It does not necessarily follow, however, that attorney 
communications with an incarcerated client receive lesser Fourth 
Amendment protection than with an un-incarcerated client.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court expressly stated in Lanza v. New York (“Lanza”) that 
“[e]ven in jail, or perhaps especially there, the relationship which the 
law has endowed with particularized confidentiality must continue to 
receive unceasing protection.”155 
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York in Lonegan v. Hasty (“Lonegan”) held that “in the 
prison setting, attorney-client communications generally are 
distinguished from other kinds of communications and exempted 
from routine monitoring.”156  Lonegan involved the taping of suspected 
9/11 terrorists’ attorney-client meetings at the Brooklyn, New York 
MDC.157  The government argued that the presence of video cameras 
in the meeting area and the fact that the detainees were terrorism 
suspects rendered the defense attorneys’ subjective expectation of 
privacy objectively unreasonable.158  The Lonegan court disagreed, 
holding that “the existence of robust protections for attorney-client 
communications makes [the attorneys’] expectation of privacy in their 
conversations with Detainees reasonable.”159  Indeed, the Lonegan court 
expressly noted that attorney-client communications are protected by 
the Fourth Amendment,160 and found that the attorneys had stated a 
sufficient claim of a Fourth Amendment violation to survive a motion 
to dismiss. 
 
 154  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the 
prison cell.  The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells 
simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and 
objectives of penal institutions.”); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of 
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012) (holding that even detained arrestees have a 
lesser expectation of privacy in arriving at jail). 
 155  Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962); see also In re State Police Litig., 
888 F. Supp. 1235, 1256 (D. Conn. 1995) (“[W]here conversations (in jail) consist of 
privileged communications between clients and their attorneys, an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable.”). 
 156  Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  This statement 
may be contrasted with the BOP Regulation, which involves targeted rather than 
routine monitoring.  
 157  See discussion supra Part II. 
 158  Lonegan, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 432. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. at 435. 
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While some intrusive measures unique to prison life may lower an 
attorney’s expectation of privacy while there—such as turning over a 
cell phone or being subject to a pat-down—these measures should not 
affect the attorney’s expectations with regard to his client 
conversations.  First, the sacrosanct position of attorney-client 
communications in the legal sphere militates in favor of the notion 
that privacy and confidentiality will govern all such communications.161  
As stated in Lanza, the attorney-client relationship is guarded with the 
utmost protection, even or perhaps especially in jail.  Second, the 
intrusive measures taken in prisons are justified on the grounds of 
physical safety and security, not obtainment of information for law 
enforcement purposes.  There is no increase in physical safety by the 
surreptitious monitoring of privileged communications.  As such, an 
attorney retains the same expectation of privacy in a jail with regard to 
her attorney-client communications as she does elsewhere. 
In the case of Guantanamo habeas corpus attorneys, an attorney 
has an even higher expectation of privacy when escorted to a private 
interview room to meet her client, while receiving express assurances 
that no surveillance is occurring within.162  Those assurances speak to 
the reasonableness of the attorney’s subjective expectation of privacy, 
and would certainly influence the reasonable person’s expectations 
under the circumstances. 
V.  GOVERNMENT INTRUSION INTO ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
COMMUNICATIONS VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY 
RIGHTS OF THE ATTORNEY 
Because traditional “standing” doctrine has been abrogated in 
favor of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test,163 an attorney’s 
right to assert a constitutional violation is not dependent on, or 
derivative of, his client’s right to assert the same.  Instead, so long as 
the government actor has either violated an attorney’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy or physically trespassed on an attorney’s 
protected area or item, the attorney’s Fourth Amendment rights have 
been violated.  Said another way, government intrusion into attorney-
 
 161  See Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1349 (M.D. Fl. 2012) (“No 
reasonable attorney in Gennusa’s position would have expected that her conversations 
with her client were being actively monitored and recorded when no officers were 
present in the room.”). 
 162  See supra Part II. 
 163  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“[W]e think the better analysis 
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined, 
concept of standing.”).  
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client communications violates the Fourth Amendment privacy rights 
of the attorney under either the Katz invasion of privacy test or the Jones 
trespass test. 
 
A.  The Katz Test—Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
To reiterate, the Katz test requires that a government actor violate 
a person’s subjective expectation of privacy, which is one that society 
objectively recognizes as reasonable.164  Generally, a person manifests 
her subjective expectation of privacy by taking actions that signal the 
exclusion of others.  Building a fence around one’s home,165 putting 
up “No Trespassing” signs,166 and drawing the blinds167 have all been 
held as sufficient manifestations of a subjective expectation of privacy.  
As to papers specifically, a person may put private documents in a 
locked briefcase168 or deposit box.169  For intangible papers like emails, 
most people have the ability to password-protect their email 
accounts.170  Taking additional steps like encryption171 or, in the special 
case of attorneys, having a “confidentiality notice,”172 would likewise 
suffice.  As to verbal communications, actions like whispering, closing 
the door, or asking others not to interrupt signal to the outside world 
that the conversation about to take place is private.173  Indeed, closing 
the phone booth door was all the proof the Supreme Court required 
to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the Katz case 
 
 164  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 165  See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).  
 166  See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987). 
 167  See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that 
no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no Fourth Amendment violation, 
existed where defendant failed to draw the blinds and contraband was visible); United 
States v. Wisniewski, 21 M.J. 370, 372 (C.M.A. 1986) (same); United States v. $61,433.04 
U.S. Currency, 894 F. Supp. 906, 917 (E.D.N.C. 1995), aff’d sub nom., United States v. 
Taylor, 90 F.3d 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).  
 168  See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980).  
 169  See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 88-6341, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9628, at 
*6 (6th Cir. July 5, 1989).  
 170  See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (comparing 
password-protected files with a “locked footlocker” or other locked, personal 
containers for Fourth Amendment purposes).  
 171  See, e.g., Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 412 (4th Cir. 2001) (likening encryption 
to locked, personal containers and citing a Department of Justice manual indicating 
that there can be no apparent authority to search encrypted or password-protected 
emails).  
 172  See, e.g., Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97, 110 (D.D.C. 
2009) (finding confidentiality notice sufficient to manifest reasonable expectation of 
privacy in attorney-client emails even though sent through employer email account).  
 173  In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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itself.174 
In the case of the Guantanamo attorneys, each of the lawyers 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy as to communications 
with their clients in several ways.  First, the attorneys were only allowed 
to meet their clients in one closed, secure interrogation room in Camp 
Echo.175  Second, the attorneys questioned multiple government 
representatives regarding the security and privacy of the meeting 
room, and were assured on multiple occasions that the meetings were 
not being monitored.176  Third, the habeas attorneys were all directed 
to use one allegedly secure server for sending and storing emails and 
documents related to their representation.  Many of the defense’s 
emails and work-product documents disappeared from that secure 
server.177  The government assured the attorneys that their documents 
and emails were erroneously erased during a technical malfunction in 
backing up the secure drive; coincidentally enough, however, none of 
the government’s own emails or documents were deleted during this 
process.  Only defense documents disappeared.  In sum, the 
Guantanamo attorneys manifested a subjective expectation that their 
client conversations—both in-person and remote—would remain 
private. 
B.  The Katz Test—Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
There is simply no question that an objectively reasonable 
expectation exists that attorney-client communications are not being 
surreptitiously monitored by the government.  Society at large must 
expect attorney-client communications to be confidential, or else 
attorneys would never be able to elicit sufficient facts from their clients 
to adequately prepare a defense.  The Supreme Court has noted the 
damaging “chilling effect” on attorney-client communications that 
would result if society did not have faith that attorneys keep mum 
about clients’ business.178 
The law is rife with language extolling the necessity of keeping 
attorney-client communications confidential.  As the Supreme Court 
puts it, “[b]ecause of the significance of encourag[ing] the client to 
 
 174  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 175  DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS, supra note 35, at 1.  
 176  Id. at 6.  
 177  Defense Motion to Abate, supra note 42.  
 178  Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402–05 (1976) (attorney-client privilege 
protects only those disclosures which might not have been made absent the privilege, 
because the purpose of the privilege is to encourage confidential disclosures by a client 
to an attorney).  
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communicate fully and frankly with counsel, attorney-client 
communications have been universally recognized as confidential—
even after the client’s death.”179  As one scholar writes, “the expectation 
of privacy associated with [attorney-client communications] is more 
than reasonable—it is necessary.”180  In addition to being the oldest of 
all evidentiary privileges,181 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
likewise recognize the confidentiality of attorney-client 
communications.182  Even the far-reaching BOP Regulation requires 
that the attorney be notified if monitoring is to take place.183  In fact, 
violating attorney-client confidentiality is so egregious an offense to 
our legal system that it per se represents a violation of the client’s Fifth 
Amendment right to due process of law,184 as well as his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.185  There is thus 
no doubt that society is prepared to recognize an attorney’s 
expectation that her client conversations are private. 
In sum, the Guantanamo attorneys manifested a subjective 
expectation that their client communications were private, which is an 
expectation that society deems reasonable.  As such, surreptitious 
government monitoring of these conversations—after express 
assurances that no monitoring was taking place, no less—constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search under the Katz test. 
C.  The Jones Trespass Test 
Again, the Supreme Court held in Jones that whenever the 
government physically intrudes on a constitutionally protected area or 
item to obtain information for law enforcement or investigative 
reasons, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred and a warrant is 
required.186  Jones also clarified that a “seizure” of property occurs when 
there is “some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory 
interest” in that property.187  Under Jones, government surveillance of 
attorney-client communications is a Fourth Amendment trespass on 
two grounds.  First, the notes attorneys take during client 
 
 179  Swidler v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410–11 (1998) (emphasis added).  
 180  Cunningham & Srader, supra note 9, at 339.  
 181  FED. R. EVID. 501.  
 182  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2015).  
 183  28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2) (2014).  
 184  Dobbins, supra note 12. 
 185  See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964).  See also Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 186  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
 187  Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 113 (1984)). 
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conversations, as well as their emails or other correspondence relating 
to the legal representation, are constitutionally protected “papers” 
under the Fourth Amendment.188  The viewing and copying of attorney 
notes via furtive digital video recording constitute a trespass search 
under Jones.  Likewise, the government’s surreptitious deletion of 
attorney emails and work-product documents from the allegedly 
secure server constitutes a “seizure.”189  Second, the designated room 
in which attorneys meet their clients to have confidential and 
privileged conversations is a constitutionally protected area.190  Much 
like the “spike mikes” of generations past, the clandestine placement 
of video cameras and microphones in the designated room where 
attorneys meet their clients is a physical trespass into the intimate 
papers, effects, and person of the attorney. 
It is clear that the government interfered with Guantanamo 
attorney-client communications for the illicit reason of “obtaining 
information.”191  First, one of the stated purposes of recording attorney-
client conversations at Guantanamo Bay “was to assist in the 
preparation of debriefing reports.”192  Second, multiple government 
agencies have drafted reports based on the same attorney-client 
recordings.193  Assuming, arguendo, that the eavesdropping was not for 
law enforcement purposes, there is little value to listening-in on 
attorney-client communications at Guantanamo beyond getting the 
defense’s trial strategy.  Such a purpose, of course, is no less illicit 
under the Fourth Amendment because it is still a trespass on a 
constitutionally protected area for the purpose of obtaining 
information.  Thus, whether the government’s actions at Guantanamo 
vis-a-vis attorney-client communications are analyzed under the Katz 
expectation of privacy test or the Jones trespass test, the result is the 
same: the government is violating the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
 188  See, e.g., United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
attorney-notes and other work product stored in a prison cell have a diminished 
expectation of privacy, but that those stored elsewhere retain their constitutional 
protections).  
 189  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (holding that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurs 
whenever there is “meaningful interference with,” including taking possession of, 
one’s property). 
 190  See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).  
 191  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. 
 192  DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS, supra note 35, at 14 (quoting CIA 
OFFICE, supra note 20, at 36).  
 193  DENBEAUX ET AL., SPYING ON ATTORNEYS, supra note 35, at 14 (comparing CIA 
OFFICE, supra note 20, at 36, with AIR FORCE OFFICE, supra note 30, at 60).  
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VI.  CONGRESS SHOULD PASS LEGISLATION MAKING INVASION OF 
PRIVACY A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION 
This Comment has thus far identified a two-fold problem.  First, 
the federal government is spying on attorney-client communications at 
Guantanamo and is very likely spying on Guantanamo attorneys’ 
private communications outside Guantanamo as well.194  Second, 
currently available remedies are insufficient to either correct the 
intrusions or incentivize the government to stay within constitutional 
bounds.  This Part details the insufficiency of current remedies and 
proposes that the solution is Congressional action. 
While Congress has permitted government surveillance of 
attorney-client communications in some contexts, it nearly always 
requires procedural safeguards like minimization procedures and ante 
and post hoc judicial review.195  Yet, both the government surveillance 
and the judicial review may be conducted permissibly in secret.196  
Those who are able to discover the surveillance and seek redress for 
the unconstitutional invasion of their privacy must file a Bivens action. 
A Bivens action is an eponymous nod to the case that first 
recognized a cause of action for constitutional violations by federal 
actors, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics.197  
By contrast, where constitutional violations are carried out by state or 
municipal actors, aggrieved parties file suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Historically, it made sense for Congress to provide a statutory cause of 
action for state and municipal constitutional violations but not for 
federal violations, as the general police power (and therefore the 
majority of criminal process) was effected by state and municipal 
actors.  As the federal government becomes increasingly involved in 
general police work, however—particularly in the booming arenas of 
immigration, drug enforcement, cybercrimes, and terrorism—the 
federal government’s accountability should increase proportionally. 
Unlike a Section 1983 claim, liability under Bivens attaches only to 
individual actors and not government agencies.198  This rule only 
decreases an aggrieved attorney’s possibility of recovery.  First, it may 
be impossible to identify individual actors given the clandestine nature 
of spying; indeed, it may even be impossible to name which agency the 
agents work for, as plaintiff Bivens did.199  Second, there is no implied 
 
 194  See supra Part II. 
 195  See supra Part III. 
 196  See supra Part III.D. 
 197  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 198  Id. at 396–97.  
 199  Id. 
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private right of action under Bivens against private entities that engage 
in alleged constitutional deprivations while acting under color of 
federal law.200 As such, an aggrieved attorney could not sue, for 
example, Hotmail, for turning over all of his emails to the government, 
even if Hotmail violated the attorney’s Fourth Amendment rights in 
doing so. 
The biggest hurdle represented by Bivens actions, however, is the 
judiciary itself.  Jurists determining Bivens actions have unilaterally 
denied Fourth Amendment claims based on government surveillance; 
no person—attorney  or otherwise—has succeeded on the merits in a 
Fourth Amendment suit based on government surveillance.201  Federal 
courts have only recognized that such a cause of action even exists four 
times.202  At least empirically speaking, then, leaving our constitutional 
right of privacy to the discretion of the judiciary in a Bivens action 
seems imprudent. 
Similarly, attorneys have not succeeded in actions asserting 
violations of the federal statutes alleged to protect citizens’ privacy, 
discussed in Part III, supra.203  Typically, courts dismiss actions by 
attorneys on grounds of standing, asserting that any constitutional 
violations that occur due to monitoring attorney-client 
communications inure to the client.204  Courts have also dismissed 
attorneys’ suits for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
 
 200 See, e.g., Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that employee could not sue government contractor employer 
under Bivens for Fourth Amendment violations); Flores v. United States, 689 F.3d 894 
(8th Cir. 2012) (holding that alien who died in federal custody while awaiting 
deportation could not sue government contracted doctor or facility under Bivens).   
 201  At least, the author can find none in the federal courts. 
 202  See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851 (RJL), 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 
2013) (holding that content providers like Google and Yahoo have standing to 
challenge NSA surveillance programs on Fourth Amendment grounds); Fazaga v. 
F.B.I., 885 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that Muslims sufficiently 
stated a Fourth Amendment violation based on unlawful police surveillance at their 
mosque to survive a 12(b)(6) motion); Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (M.D. 
Fl. 2012) (holding that attorney and client sufficiently stated a Fourth Amendment 
violation based on unlawful police surveillance at the police department to survive a 
12(b)(6) motion); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 203  See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (holding 
that attorneys had no standing to sue for Patriot Act violations stemming from NSA 
warrantless wiretapping of calls with their international clients); ACLU Found. of S. 
California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that attorneys failed to 
state a claim for Patriot Act violations where police intercepted attorney-client 
communications pursuant to a FISC order regarding clients); Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 
279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that only client, not attorney, could 
assert constitutional violations based on BOP Regulation monitoring).   
 204  See, e.g., Al-Owhali, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27.  
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Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting either that attorneys do not have 
independent Fourth Amendment rights or that the surveillance was 
pursuant to a valid (if secret) court order.205 
Moreover, the courts charged with keeping the government’s 
surveillance within constitutional bounds—the FISCs—have officially 
held that secret, widespread, and non-targeted surveillance of 
American citizens does not violate the Fourth Amendment.206  In 
August 2013, however, FISC Chief Judge Reggie B. Walton 
contradicted this official declaration.  In a written statement to the 
Washington Post, Chief Judge Walton asserted that the FISC lacks the 
ability to independently verify how often government surveillance 
violates court rules that protect citizens’ privacy and that the FISC 
cannot check the veracity of the government’s assertions that the 
violations its staff members report are unintentional mistakes.207  
Instead, the “FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the 
information that is provided to the Court,” and “does not have the 
capacity to investigate issues of noncompliance.”208  Indeed, a May 2012 
internal audit revealed thousands of violations of FISC court orders 
and rules per year.209  In sum, then, it appears that the judiciary has 
neither the resources nor the willingness to provide an appropriate 
level of protection for citizens’ constitutional rights in the face of 
sweeping executive power to conduct secret surveillance. 
Even if the judiciary were diligently guarding citizens from 
unconstitutional government surveillance on a case-by-case basis, the 
courts’ incremental, ad hoc response would remain an insufficient 
check against the current, sweeping executive intrusions.  Given the 
judiciary’s paltry response, the legislature is the last resort upon which 
we must call to keep the Executive in check.  Congressional action is 
the appropriate response because neither the Executive’s discretion 
pre-surveillance nor the judiciary’s review post-surveillance has been 
sufficient to protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.  Indeed, 
Congress is aware of the illegality of many federal surveillance 
 
 205  See, e.g., ACLU Found. of S. Cal., 952 F.2d at 472. 
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programs.210  And while state law usually controls common law torts 
such as invasion of privacy,211 federal law should proportionally expand 
as the federal government increasingly intrudes on the privacy of 
everyday citizens for general law enforcement purposes.  Moreover, 
Congress has the resources and expertise to hold hearings and make 
findings in order to adopt the most effective procedural safeguards, 
and still retains the surveillance capabilities necessary for the Executive 
to secure our nation’s safety.  Given their comparable structures, 
Congress can even rely on state privacy statutes in drafting new 
legislation. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Government surveillance of average citizens is at best 
objectionable, and more likely illegal and unconstitutional.  
Government eavesdropping on attorney-client communications, 
however, is a particularly egregious violation.  Our legal system, as 
embodied in the United States Constitution, was founded by men 
diametrically opposed to government interference in everyday life.  
The Fourth Amendment in particular was meant to stand as a bastion 
against the government’s ability to rummage through our personal 
effects, including our private correspondence.  This Comment argues 
that there is not, and should not be, a “criminal defense attorney” 
exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Specifically, the government 
should not be permitted to monitor a private citizen’s personal 
communications simply because she has assumed legal representation 
of a criminal defendant.  Yet, protected by a deferential and submissive 
judiciary, our federal agencies have been doing precisely that. 
While this Comment provides evidence of government 
surveillance of Guantanamo attorney-client communications, it is easy 
to extrapolate the experience of Professor Denbeaux and his 
Guantanamo colleagues to the average, stateside defense attorney.  
Indeed, recent news headlines suggest that there is far more 
surveillance being conducted than anyone without security clearance 
can know.  As attorneys, we know better than most the compelling 
privacy interests at stake when government surveillance goes 
unchecked.  Lest the Fourth Amendment become a distant memory, 
 
 210  See Publius, After FISA Court Decision, Congress Can’t Say They Didn’t Know What 
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it is time we call upon Congress to make unconstitutional, surreptitious 
government surveillance a federal cause of action for invasion of 
privacy. 
